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one Illinois license plate, was being driven on a highway commonly used
by rum runners and the drivers refused to stop when first ordered and
laughed when arrested. Held combination of suspicious circumstances gave
officers reasonable and probable grounds to believe a felony was being committed and justified a search of the car without a warrant under Burns
1926, Secs. 2175 and 2748 (the quotation of Sec. 2175 by the reporter,
Sec. 2176 is probably the one meant). Faut v. State, Sup. Ct. Ind., Oct. 8,
1929, 168 N. E. 124.
The question of probable cause in search and seizure cases is still very
unsettled in Indiana but such cases as have been decided have shown a
tendency to be careful that the circumstances were sufficiently suspicious
to justify the search. An officer who has not learned, thru the exercise
of his senses or thru other reliable information, facts which would justify
a reasonable person in believing that a felony was being committed cannot
search an automobile without a warrant. Eier v. State, 196 Ind. 252. An
anonymous telephone call is not strong enough grounds to justify a search,
even when the cars were described and officers noticed them to be heavily
ladened. U. S. v. Allen, 16 Fed. (2nd) 320, (cited with approval in the
principal case). Search after an arrest on other grounds was held sufficient in Koseloski v. State, 199 Ind. 546, 158 N. E. 902; Hoberstick v. State,
196 Ind, 145, 147 N. E. 625. But no other offense was apparent here, operation with one license plate being permitted under Burns 1926, See. 10087.
The suspicious character of an automobile alone is not sufficient ground
for search. Robinson v. State, 197 Ind. 144, 149 N. E. 891; Boyd V. State,
198 Ind. 55, 152 N. E. 278. But container commonly used to carry liquor,
carried in plain sight in the car, gives rise to probable cause Thomas V.
State, 196 Ind. 234, 146 N. E. 850; Guelting v. State, 196 Ind. 643, 148
N. E. 146. Refusal of driver to stop when hailed by officers is not reasonable grounds for belief that driver was transporting liquor. Robinson V.
State, 197 Ind. 144, 149 N. E. 891. Demeanor of one who, after being
stopped by a sheriff, not having actual knowledge that a felony is being
committed, told officer that car contained "red whiskey" was held to be
insufficient grounds for search of the car by the sheriff. Dancaster v.
State, 197 Ind. 635, 151 N. E. 724.
The majority of states have followed the Federal rule of allowing a
wide discretion in the officers making a search of a car. "Information from
a credible source, together with facts indicating such information is correct will justify a search of an automobile without a search warrant."
Brady v. U. S., 300 Fed. 540; People v. De Ceasar, (Mich., 1922) 190 N.
W. 302. Suspicious actions of one on previous occasions were held sufficient cause for search in Hauck v. State, (Ohio, 1922) 140 N. E. 112. The
fact that the one arrested was driving on a road notorious for its use by
bootleggers was held to lessen the requirements for probable cause in Lafazia v. U. S., 4 Fed. (2nd) 817.
The principal case, while requiring less comprehensive reasons to justify search without a warrant than most previous Indiana decisions, seems
J. S. G.
sound and is probably in accord with the majority of states.
JUDGMENT-ACTION UPON-APPLICATION OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-.
On June 25, 1914, appellee recovered three separate judgments in the Lake
Circuit Court against appellant. No execution was issued on any of these
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judgments, nor was any proceeding had to collect them until May 15, 1928,
when appellee filed this action in Lake Superior Court, on a complaint in
three paragraphs on the three separate judgments rendered in the Lake
Circuit Court, June 25, 1914. Burns' Ann. St. 1926, par. 302, provides
that actions . . . on judgments of courts of record, must be brought
within 20 years after the cause of action has accrued; and par. 659 provides that "all final judgments in the supreme and circuit courts for the
recovery of money or costs shall be a lien upon real estate and chattels
real liable to execution in the county where judgment is rendered for the
space of 10 years after the rendition thereof, and no longer-etc." Appellant contends that since no execution was issued on said judgments and
no attempt had been made to collect same, and no suit had been instituted
on said judgments within 10 years after their rendition, said judgments
were "dead." Held: Judgment affirmed. Action may be had on judgment
after ten years and before twenty years have expired, and lien of new
judgment runs for 10 years. Town of New Chicago v. First State Bank of
Hobart, Appellate Court of Indiana, Dec. 6, 1929, 169 N. E. 56.
The two sections of the statute above set out must be construed together, and, when so construed, mean that execution may be had on a
judgment at any time within 10 years after rendition thereof, but after
10 years and before the expiration of 20 years, another action may be had
on the original judgment and a new judgment may be rendered, the lien
of which begins at the date of the new judgment and runs for 10 years.
The lien commences in Indiana with the rendition of the judgment and it
has been held that indexing or docketing is not an essential condition precedent to the attaching of said lien, which, by weight of authority attaches
upon real property acquired by defendant after rendition of judgment;
Campbell v. Martin, 87 Ind. 577; although such lien does not usually relate
back to the rendition of judgment. Barth v. Makeever, 4 Bliss. (U. S.)
206; Chandlerv. Cromwell, 101 Miss. 161, 57 South. 554; Lessert v. Sieberling, 59 Neb. 309, 80 N. W. 900. It was held in Gould v. Hayden, 63 Ind.
443, that a judgment is a debt of record upon which an action may be
maintained either in the court which rendered such judgment or in any
other court of competent jurisdiction even though the judgment plaintiff
could have enforced the collection of his judgment by an execution issued
out of the court in which said judgment was rendered. Many jurisdictions, however, will allow no action upon a judgment until after expiration of the time in which execution may issue to enforce same. Lee v.
Giles, 1 Bail (S. C.) 449; McDonald v. Ayres, (Tex.) 242 S. W. 192. But
even under this latter and stricter view, it is clear that the action in the
principal case was proper since the time in which execution might issue
had expired. The grounds given for refusing to allow the judgment plaintiff a second action while he has every remedy for the enforcement of his
first judgment which he could employ to compel the satisfaction of the
second, are that such would permit defendant to be vexed and harrassed
without conferring corresponding benefit on the plaintiff. This is a valid
objection, but it has been generally overruled and the rule laid down in
the principal case-that no steps to revive the lien of the judgment or to
enforce the payment thereof, is a condition precedent to maintaining an
action thereon-is the majority rule. Freeman on Judgments, 5th Ed.,
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par. 1061. It is clear that under the statutes as interpreted, the judgment
plaintiff may renew his action ad infinitum upon each successive judgment
thus recovered, provided the action is brought anytime within the 20 year
period of limitation, since any other construction would nullify the statutes. The statute of limitations begins to run upon a judgment only when
it is final and enforceable by action, which is normally when it becomes
effective by rendition and entry; Sweetser v. Fox, 43 Utah 40, Ann. Cas.
1916C 620; (and other cases there cited) and in the absence of a statute,
if an action is begun within the statutory period, a new judgment obtained thereon would be effective and actionable for another period of equal
length. In some states, even after the 20 year period has run, the judgment may be revived by a part payment or new promise, since contracts
may be revived in this manner, and such states hold that judgments are
contracts. The case of Niblack v. Goodman, 67 Ind. 174, holds with the
weight of authority that a judgment is not a contract (authorities pro
and con cited in 8 L. R. A. [N. S.] 444) although Odell v. Green, 122 N. E.
791, 72 Ind. App. 65, holds that in no event does a statute of limitations
utterly destroy a judgment, and if the limitation be not pleaded it is
waived, whereupon the judgment which is the foundation of the action,
although over 20 years old, will sustain a new judgment, while if the
limitation is pleaded and the action thereby barred, yet the old judgment
will be a sufficient consideration for a new promise The latter case is in
conflict with section 86, subsection 1, of the American Law Institute's restatement of the law of Contracts, and is clearly unsupported by the weight
K. J. M.
of authority.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-ORAL PROMISE To ANSWER FOR THE DEBT OF ANOTHER-CONSTRUCTION OF "ASSUME AND AGREE TO PAY . . ."-The defendant contracted with state to build a road; and with a gravel firm to
furnish defendant with gravel for the project. The gravel firm became
involved with its creditors, whereupon the gravel firm and the defendant
called a meeting of creditors, at which the affairs of gravel firm were
placed in hands of a creditors-committee, who were to carry out the contract to furnish defendant with gravel. The defendant orally agreed at
this meeting to pay all persons and laborers engaged in delivering gravel.
On suit to enforce defendant's promise, defendant pleaded the statute of
frauds (Section 8045 of '26 Burns); that his promise was a promise to
answer "for the debt of another." Held: The defendant is liable for all
laborers engaged in delivering gravel, since when the gravel firm failed
and the creditors took charge they did so for the benefit of all parties, and
from then on all parties continued to work for the defendant, and therefore the promise of defendant was not a promise to answer for the debt
of another, but to answer for his own debt. Davis Construction Company
v. Petty, Appellate Court of Indiana, Nov. 18, 1929, 168 N. E. 769.
The authorities in accord are many. Edwards v. Van Cleave, 94 N. E.
596; Miller v. State, 35 Ind. App. 379, 74 N. E. 260; Gibson County v. Cincinnati Steam Heating Company, 128 Ind. 240, 27 N. E. 612, 12 L. R. A.
502.
And on principle the case is sound. The federal rule has generally
been stated to be "Where the main purpose of the new arrangement is to
subserve the interest of th6 new promisor, the agreement is not within

